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 22 
Abstract 23 
Evaluating the costs and benefits of our own choices is central to most forms of decision-making and 24 
its mechanisms in the brain are becoming increasingly well understood. To interact successfully in 25 
social environments it is also essential to monitor the rewards that others receive. Previous studies 26 
in non-human primates have found neurons in the Anterior Cingulate Cortex (ACC) that signal the 27 
net-value (benefit minus cost) of rewards that will be received oneself, and also neurons that signal 28 
when a reward will be received by someone else. However, little is understood about the way in 29 
which the human brain engages in cost-benefit analyses during social interactions. Does the ACC 30 
signal the net-value (the benefits minus the costs) of rewards that others will receive? Here, using 31 
fMRI we examined activity time-locked to cues that signalled the anticipated reward magnitude 32 
(benefit) to be gained and the level of effort (cost) to be incurred either by a subject themselves or 33 
by a social confederate. We investigated whether activity in the ACC covaries with the net-value of 34 
rewards that someone else will receive when that person is required to exert effort for the reward. 35 
We show that while activation in the sulcus of the Anterior Cingulate Cortex (ACCs) signalled the 36 
costs on all trials, gyral ACC (ACCg) activity varied parametrically only with the net-value of rewards 37 
gained by others. These results suggest that the ACCg plays an important role in signalling cost-38 
benefit information, by signalling the value of others’ rewards during social interactions. 39 
 40 
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Theories of decision-making highlight that choices are made by weighing up rewarding benefits 47 
against the costs incurred to receive desired outcomes (Bautista et al., 1998; Phillips et al., 2007). 48 
Such cost-benefit analyses underpin decision-making in many species, including humans (Charnov, 49 
1976; Kagel and Levin, 1986; Bautista et al., 2001). However, it has often been overlooked that such 50 
decisions are not made in a social vacuum (Walton and Baudonnat, 2012). Our decisions are 51 
influenced by cost-benefit analyses that we apply to understand others’ rewarding outcomes. We 52 
investigate the neural processes that are involved in evaluating the costs and benefits of rewards 53 
received oneself self and by others.  54 
The Anterior Cingulate Cortex (ACC) is engaged when processing information about rewards (Rogers 55 
et al., 2004; Sallet et al., 2007) and there is evidence that it plays an important role in cost-benefit 56 
evaluation (Phillips et al., 2007; Walton and Baudonnat, 2012). Neurons in the ACC encode the net-57 
value of rewards (benefit – cost) at the time of cues that are instructive of how much effort is 58 
required (cost) for primary reinforcement (benefit) (Kennerley et al., 2009; Kennerley et al., 2011; 59 
Hillman and Bilkey, 2012). Neuroimaging studies have shown that activity in the ACC at the time of 60 
such cues is a function of the magnitude of a secondary reinforcer and the anticipated amount of 61 
effort (Botvinick et al., 2009; Croxson et al., 2009). This evidence suggests that the ACC signals the 62 
net-value of rewards when they are to be received oneself.  63 
The ACC is also implicated in the processing of social information (Behrens et al., 2009). Within the 64 
ACC there is a dissociation between information processing in the sulcus (ACCs) and the gyrus (ACCg). 65 
Lesions to the ACCs, that leave the ACCg intact, disrupt first-person decision-making (Kennerley et al., 66 
2006). In contrast, lesions to the ACCg, that leave the ACCs intact, disrupt social behaviour and the 67 
processing of social stimuli (Rudebeck et al., 2006). However, there is evidence that the ACCg and 68 
ACCs are both sensitive to reward-related information during decision-making (Behrens et al., 2009). 69 
While the ACCs processes information about one’s own rewarding outcomes, the ACCg is engaged 70 
when monitoring choices others make to obtain rewarding outcomes (Behrens et al., 2008; Apps et 71 
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al., 2013b; Chang et al., 2013). This implicates the ACC g  as a candidate for processing the net-value 72 
of rewards others will receive (Apps et al., 2013a). However, no previous study has investigated 73 
activity in the brain when subjects weigh up the costs and benefits of rewards that others will 74 
receive.  75 
Using fMRI we examine activity time-locked to cues that signalled the level of economic reward 76 
available, the cost incurred for receipt and also whether the rewards and costs pertained to the first-77 
person or to a third-person. We tested the hypothesis that ACCg activity signals the anticipated net-78 
value of rewards to be received by a third-person when they are required to exert effort to gain 79 
them, and that ACCs activity signals net-value in relation to rewards gained oneself. 80 
 81 
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 93 
Methods 94 
Subjects  95 
Subjects were sixteen, healthy right-handed participants screened for neurological disorders (aged 96 
between 18 and 32; 13 female). Two subjects were excluded from the analyses. Both subjects failed 97 
to maintain a belief in the deception and one of these subjects failed to perform the judgement task 98 
(see below) better than chance (one male). All participants gave written informed consent. The 99 
studies were approved by the Royal Holloway, University of London Psychology Department Ethics 100 
Committee and conformed to the regulations set out in the CUBIC MRI rules of Operations. Subjects 101 
were paired up with one of two confederate participants, who they believed were also naïve 102 
participants. The subjects believed that they would be paid for their participation based on their 103 
performance of the task during a scanning session (see below). They also believed that the 104 
confederate would be paid based on their performance in the same manner. 105 
 106 
Apparatus 107 
Subjects lay supine in an MRI scanner with the fingers of the right hand positioned on an MRI-108 
compatible response box. Stimuli were projected onto a screen behind the subject and viewed in a 109 
mirror positioned above the subjects face. Presentation software (Neurobehavioral Systems, Inc., 110 
USA) was used for experimental control (stimulus presentation and response collection). A custom-111 
built parallel port interface connected to the Presentation PC received transistor-transistor logic 112 
(TTL) pulse inputs from the response keypad. It also received TTL pulses from the MRI scanner at the 113 
onset of each volume acquisition, allowing events in the experiment to become precisely 114 
synchronized with the onset of each scan. The timings of all events in the experiment were sampled 115 
accurately, continuously and simultaneously (independently of Presentation) at a frequency of 1 kHz 116 
using an A/D 1401 unit (Cambridge Electronic Design, UK). Spike2 software was used to create a 117 
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temporal record of these events. Reaction times were calculated off-line, and event timings were 118 
prepared for subsequent general linear model (GLM) analysis of fMRI data (see below). 119 
  120 
Experimental Design 121 
The aim of this experiment was to examine the processing of cues that instructed a first-person and 122 
a third-person as to how much reward they would receive following the exertion of differing levels 123 
of effort. Subjects performed a task over two days with a training partner (confederate). On the first 124 
day, the subject and the confederate learned the associations between a set of instruction cues, a 125 
financial reward, and how much effort they were required to expend for its receipt. On the second 126 
day, both agents continued to perform effortful actions to receive rewards. During this session, the 127 
subject performed these trials whilst inside the MRI scanner, with the training partner situated in 128 
the adjacent control room.  129 
A 2x2x2 Factorial design was employed to examine activity time-locked to instruction cues (see 130 
fig.1). The first factor was Agency. On each trial either the subject (first-person) or the confederate 131 
(third-person) performed a series of cued button presses (or ‘cancellations’) on a keypad to receive a 132 
reward. The second factor was the reward level that was obtainable on each trial. This could be 133 
either high (HR), if 16 UK pence (p) was obtainable on the trial, or low (LR), if only 4p was obtainable. 134 
The third factor was the level of effort. There were four levels of effort (two, three, eight or 12 135 
responses), which corresponded to the number of cancellations (cued button presses) that were 136 
required to receive the reward. These were collapsed into either low effort (LE; two or three 137 
cancellations) or high effort (HE; 8 or 12 cancellations) conditions for the factorial design. All cues 138 
were colour-coded on each trial, such that the first-person responded when stimuli were blue and 139 
the third-person when stimuli were brown. On each trial, the instruction cues signalled the level of 140 
reward available and effort required by either the first-person or the third-person. The instruction 141 
cue stimuli were based around those used in previous studies (Knutson and Bossaerts, 2007; 142 
Croxson et al., 2009) that investigated first-person reward prediction processing. The stimuli were 143 
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80mm diameter circles containing crosshairs. The position of the crosshairs indicated both the 144 
amount of reward that was obtainable and the number of cancellations required to receive that 145 
reward. Reward was represented vertically on the circle (16p was high on the circle, 4p was low). 146 
Effort was represented horizontally with increasing levels of effort represented from left to right.  147 
In total there were 16 different trial types dependent on the reward level, effort level and the agent 148 
performing the cancellations. There were eight different trial types for each level of Agent (see fig.1).  149 
Trial Structure 150 
Each trial (see fig.1) began with one of 16 different colour-coded instruction cues. These cues 151 
indicated both the level of reward that was available on each trial and also the level of effort 152 
required for its receipt. The colour of these cues also indicated who would have to perform the 153 
cancellations on each trial (blue for the first-person, brown for the third-person). Following the 154 
instruction cue there was an effort period, during which cued button presses were performed on a 155 
kepyad. During the effort period on the first-person trials, subjects were required to make a series of 156 
cued button presses (cancellations). On the third-person’s trials the cancellations were actually pre-157 
programmed computer controlled responses (see below for more details). At the end of the effort 158 
period, a stimulus then displayed the number of cancellations that had been made during the effort 159 
period. Following this stimulus, a trigger cue (three lines, with 16p over the left hand line, 4p over 160 
the middle line and 0p over the right hand line) was presented on the screen, which cued the first-161 
person or the third-person to make a judgement of the amount of reward that would be received by 162 
the other agent on that trial. Each line corresponded to one line on the keypad. Subjects had 750ms 163 
to make their response. If they did not respond in this time window it was classified as an incorrect 164 
response. Following this, a feedback cue indicated the accuracy of the judgement (“correct” if the 165 
judgement was correct and “-10p” if incorrect) and then finally a feedback cue indicated the reward 166 
received by the agent who performed the cancellations (16p, 4p or 0p). In total there were 192 167 
trials, 96 first-person trials where the subject made cancellations and 96 where they monitored the 168 
third-person’s cancellations. Each instruction cue was presented on twelve trials. 169 
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 170 
Task 171 
Subjects performed two tasks during scanning. On first-person trials subjects performed an ‘effort 172 
task’ where cancellations were made in order to receive financial rewards. On the third-person’s 173 
trials subjects performed a judgement task, monitoring the third-person’s performance of the effort 174 
task and indicating the amount of reward they would receive. 175 
Effort Task 176 
During scanning, subjects performed trials where they were required to make the correct number of 177 
cancellations to receive a financial reward. The ‘effort task’ required subjects to make a series of 178 
cancellations during the effort period. Each cancellation was cued by the position of a square 179 
stimulus above one of four lines on the screen. Each line on this cue corresponded to one button on 180 
the keypad. The position of the square highlighted a target button. A cancellation constituted one 181 
press of the target button i.e. one finger movement of one finger on the right hand. Once this target 182 
button was pressed, the position of the square would move to highlight a new target button. Each 183 
target button was always different to the previous. Subjects could make up to 14 of these 184 
cancellations during the fixed time window of the effort period (6600ms). Subjects were only 185 
rewarded on a trial if they performed exactly the number of cancellations specified by the cue. If 186 
they performed more cancellations or fewer cancellations they would not obtain the rewarding 187 
outcome. Using such an approach ensured that the level of effort expended by participants on the 188 
task was closely matched to that specified by the cue. The order of cancellations was randomised 189 
across the experiment and within each effort period. Subjects were therefore unable to make any 190 
prediction about which button would be the next target. Subjects were instructed to make 191 
cancellation responses as quickly and accurately as possible for every level of effort.  192 
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We used this cancellation task as a corollary of effortful exertion. A large number of previous studies 193 
have shown that the number of actions that are performed is in index of effort. Such studies have 194 
shown that the number of lever presses, or the number of actions or button presses modulates 195 
reaction times and choice behaviour in rats, humans and monkeys. Reaction times to reward 196 
predicting stimuli increase as the number of actions increases. Choices are made in favour of 197 
rewards associated with fewer actions than the same magnitude of reward associated with more 198 
actions (Walton et al., 2006; Phillips et al., 2007; Salamone et al., 2007; Floresco et al., 2008b; 199 
Floresco et al., 2008a; Croxson et al., 2009; Floresco and Whelan, 2009; Kennerley et al., 2009; 200 
Kennerley and Wallis, 2009; Walton et al., 2009; Day et al., 2010; Nunes et al., 2010). This supports 201 
the argument that the number of actions that are to be performed modulates the value of the 202 
rewarding outcome, as a result of the costly nature of increased effortful exertion. Thus, by using a 203 
task where the number of actions was the index of effortful exertion, we have used a paradigm that 204 
is well known to modulate reward desirability. 205 
 206 
In our task we assumed that effort could be equated to the number of cancellations made, it was 207 
therefore important that the number of required cancellations as specified in the instruction cue 208 
was closely related to the actual amount of actions performed by the subjects. To do so, we first 209 
ensured that the task was very simple and the subject and confederate were over-trained together 210 
on the task before they entered the scanner during a training phase. As a result, subjects would not 211 
press the incorrect target button for a cancellation on many trials. Thus, the number of cancellations 212 
made would be very closely related to the number of button presses made and therefore the effort 213 
expended. Furthermore the over-trained confederate was instructed to make very few mistakes in 214 
terms of which button needed to be pressed. As a result, the subject had learnt to expect that the 215 
confederate would make exactly the same number of button presses as required to make the 216 
correct number of cancellations.  217 
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Second, in the cancellation task, the subject was required to perform the correct button press for a 218 
new cancellation cue to be presented. If they pressed the incorrect button then the cancellation cue 219 
would not move to a new location. Thus, the subject inside the scanner was able to monitor the 220 
number of new targets presented to infer the number of correct button presses being made by the 221 
confederate. These two features of the design ensured that the subject was able to know the 222 
number of cancellations on every trial and also infer that this would be highly correlated with the 223 
actual number of button presses and therefore the level of effortful exertion. 224 
 225 
During scanning, subjects were told that they were accumulating monetary rewards for their 226 
performance on this task. As such subjects believed that they were earning the reward available on 227 
each first-person trial, if they performed the correct number of cancellations. Subjects were told that 228 
if they performed every cancellation correctly they would accumulate £10 as payment for the 229 
experiment. However, unbeknown to the subjects, they would be paid £10 for participation 230 
regardless of their task performance.   231 
 232 
Judgement Task 233 
In addition to the effort task, subjects also performed a judgement task on the trials where the third-234 
person was performing the effort task. For this task the subjects were required to indicate the level 235 
of reward that would be received by the third-person, which could be 16p or 4p for the correct 236 
number of cancellations or 0p if the number of cancellations was incorrect. Subjects were required 237 
to perform this judgement on every trial performed by the third-person. Subjects believed that they 238 
were punished for each incorrect judgement (when the subject indicated that the amount of money 239 
earned by the confederate on the third-person trials was different from the amount they would 240 
actually earn) by 10p being removed from the money they were accruing on the effort task. A 241 
correct judgement left the rewards accumulated during the effort task the same. Thus, subjects 242 
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believed that if they performed every set of cancellations correctly, but every judgement incorrectly, 243 
they would receive no payment for the experiment. Therefore, subjects were motivated to perform 244 
both tasks to the same degree of accuracy. This punishment ensured that subjects attended to the 245 
rewarding value and the effort information contained in the instruction cues on the third-person’s 246 
trials. Importantly, the punishment used as the motivation for the subject on the third-person’s 247 
trials, was unrelated to the anticipated reward and effort level that would be processed at the time 248 
of the instruction cues. 249 
 250 
This task required subjects to monitor both the amount of effort and the reward magnitude in the 251 
instruction cue, but also the number of cancellations performed. To perform this task correctly 252 
subjects needed to monitor the cancellations made during the effort period. They could do so in two 253 
ways. Firstly, subjects could monitor the number of times that cues disappeared during the effort 254 
period. Secondly, subjects were explicitly instructed as to how many cancellations had been made by 255 
the confederate at the end of the effort period by an additional cancellation cue. As a result, 256 
subjects were able to monitor the number of cancellations made by the confederate without 257 
difficulty. 258 
 259 
To maintain experimental control, we deceived participants as to the nature of the third-person. 260 
Whilst subjects believed they were performing the task with a real other person, the responses they 261 
saw were computer-generated. This approach was necessary in order to maintain control over the 262 
performance of the third-person. However, in order to ensure payment for the experiment was 263 
ethical and not dependent on the third-person performance, all subjects were paid the same 264 
amount for participation. Subjects were thoroughly debriefed using a standard set of questions as 265 
used previously (Ramnani and Miall, 2004; Apps et al., 2012; Apps et al., 2013b). Only two 266 
participants, who were excluded from the analysis, showed any awareness of the nature of the 267 
deception. 268 
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 269 
The effort task used in this study is very similar to that employed by Croxson et al., (2009) that was 270 
used to investigate first-person effort-discounting. Given this similarity, it is important to note the 271 
differences between the task employed here and that used by Croxson et al., (2009). Croxson et al., 272 
(2009) used 8 different instruction cues in which crosshairs indicated the level of effort and the 273 
amount of reward obtainable. There are two important differences between the effort task 274 
employed in that study and that employed here. Firstly, unlike in this study, there were no 275 
constraints placed upon the time which subjects had to make cancellations. Secondly, unlike in this 276 
experiment, subjects were only presented with the correct number of targets to be cancelled. 277 
However, these two aspects of their task were not suitable for the purposes of this study. A crucial 278 
aspect of our design was that subjects were required to make a judgement on the reward to be 279 
received by a third-person. This task ensured that subjects attended to the effort and reward levels 280 
at the time of the instruction cues on the third-person’s trials. Without a temporal constraint on the 281 
effort period, there would be no possibility of making an incorrect number of cancellations, and 282 
thus, the confederate would not make errors on the effort task. Without confederate errors, the 283 
subject could perform the judgement task by attending to the level of reward at the time of the 284 
instruction cues on the third-person’s trials and not the level of effort. Thus, in this experiment, a 285 
temporal window was a necessity. In addition, in this experiment subjects could cancel up to 14 286 
targets, more than the maximum instructed number of 12, regardless of how many cancellations 287 
they were required to make. This created the potential for catch trials, where the confederate made 288 
an error in the number of cancellations, which the subject would need to identify correctly in order 289 
to maximise their own financial rewards and perform the judgement task correctly. These two 290 
distinctions from the task used by Croxson et al., (2009) ensured subjects attended to both the effort 291 
and reward level on every confederate trial. 292 
 293 
 294 
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Procedure 295 
Training  296 
Subjects were trained in two phases one day prior to scanning. In the first phase, the subject was 297 
seated in front of a monitor with a confederate (third-person). They were each provided with a 298 
response keypad. Both the confederate and the subject performed the effort task on separate trials. 299 
During this session both the confederate and subject learned the contingency between the position 300 
of the crosshairs on the instruction cue stimulus, the amount of reward (16p or 4p) and the required 301 
number of cancellations (button presses) to receive the reward. They were informed before this that 302 
there would be two levels of reward and that they would have to make two, three, eight or twelve 303 
button presses. During training there were 64 ‘first-person’ trials where the subject performed the 304 
cancellations and 64 ‘third-person’ trials performed by the confederate. The subjects were told that 305 
the rewards were fictional during training and their payment for the experiment would be based 306 
solely on performance during the scanning session. 307 
 308 
In this session, as the subjects were seated next to the confederate, the confederates performed the 309 
effort task on separate trials from the subject. As the confederates were paired with multiple 310 
different subjects throughout the piloting and experimental phases, they were highly over-trained 311 
on the effort task. To ensure that subjects maintained the belief that the confederates were naïve 312 
participants like themselves, they were told to make deliberate errors in the number of cancellations 313 
performed during the first phase of training, to mimic the learning of a real participant. 314 
In the second phase of training, subjects practised the task that would be performed during the 315 
scanning session (see below). The subject performed this from inside a mock scanner, with the 316 
confederate seated in front of a monitor adjacent to the mock scanner. The subject was played the 317 
sound of a genuine scanner’s EPI sequence via headphones. During this training phase and during 318 
scanning the responses on the third-person trials were computer controlled. 319 
Scanning Session 320 
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Prior to scanning subjects were shown the confederate seated in front of a monitor in the control 321 
room next to the scanner. They were told that they would see all of the responses of the third-322 
person in real-time inside the scanner. In fact these responses were all computer controlled, pre-323 
programmed responses. The apparent reaction times of the confederate during the effort task were 324 
pseudorandomly organised. The reaction times of the second to twelfth button presses fitted a 325 
normal distribution around a mean (525ms), with a range of 325ms to 725ms. The confederate’s 326 
reaction times to the first target were extended, to reflect the unpredictability of the onset of this 327 
target. These formed a normal distribution around a mean of 600ms, with a range of 400ms to 328 
800ms. These timings were based on the reaction times of five participants during a pilot 329 
experiment. The apparent reaction times of the confederate were programmed to not be different 330 
regardless of the number of cancellations to be made on the trial, such that the confederate 331 
behaviour appeared to conform to the instruction responding as quickly and accurately as possible. 332 
It was also noted that such behaviour was exhibited by subjects in a pilot experiment, where no 333 
difference was found between reaction times of the first two button presses in the 2 cancellations 334 
conditions compared to the 12 cancellations conditions. 335 
Key for the design of this experiment was that subjects attended to both their own instruction cues 336 
and those of the third-person in the same manner. There was one potential caveat to the judgement 337 
task used to motivate subjects to attend to the instruction cues of confederate. Specifically, if the 338 
confederate performed the correct number of cancellations on every trial, the subject could, over 339 
time, learn to perform the judgement without attending to the level of effort, only the reward level. 340 
To address this potential confound, errors were pre-programmed into the behaviour of the 341 
confederate. On nine of the trials where the effort task was performed by the confederate, the 342 
number of cancellations performed was not correct for the instruction cue presented. These ‘catch’ 343 
trials were used as an index of the extent to which subjects were attending to the effort expended 344 
by the confederate. 345 
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 346 
Behavioural Analysis 347 
Behavioural analyses were performed in SPSS16. Performance on the effort task was analysed by 348 
performing a repeated measures ANOVA on the effect of effort on task accuracy. Planned pairwise 349 
comparisons were then performed between the 2 and 12 button press conditions, to ensure that 350 
there was no significant effect of the number of button presses (i.e. difficulty) on performance of the 351 
task. For the judgement task, paired samples t-tests were performed to examine the difference 352 
between the accuracy on the task (i.e. judging the correct reward level on the trial) and chancel level 353 
(33%). Trials in which the subject failed to respond within the 750ms response window were 354 
included as errors. In addition, we performed two ANOVAS on the accuracy on the judgement task, 355 
One which looked for an effect of reward level or effort level on accuracy and a second that looked 356 
for an effect of net-value on accuracy.  357 
 358 
Functional Imaging and analysis 359 
Data Acquisition 360 
 361 
T1-weighted structural images were acquired at a resolution of 1×1×1 mm using an MPRAGE 362 
sequence. 1164 EPI scans were acquired from each participant. 34 slices were acquired in an 363 
ascending manner, at an oblique angle (≈30˚) to the AC-PC line to decrease the impact of 364 
susceptibility artefact in subgenual cortex (Deichmann et al., 2003). A voxel size of 3×3×3 mm (25% 365 
slice gap, 0.8 mm) was used; TR=2.5s, TE=32, flip angle=81°. The functional sequence lasted 48.5 366 
minutes. Immediately following the functional sequence, phase and magnitude maps were collected 367 
using a GRE field map sequence (TE1 = 5.19ms, TE2 = 7.65ms). 368 
 369 
 370 
 371 
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Image Preprocessing 372 
Scans were pre-processed using SPM8 (www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm). The EPI images from each 373 
subject were corrected for distortions caused by susceptibility-induced field inhomogeneities using 374 
the FieldMap toolbox (Andersson et al., 2001). This approach corrects for both static distortions and 375 
changes in these distortions attributable to head motion (Hutton et al., 2002). The static distortions 376 
were calculated using the phase and magnitude field maps acquired after the EPI sequence. The EPI 377 
images were then realigned, and coregistered to the subject’s own anatomical image. The structural 378 
image was processed using a unified segmentation procedure combining segmentation, bias 379 
correction, and spatial normalization to the MNI template (Ashburner and Friston, 2005); the same 380 
normalization parameters were then used to normalize the EPI images. Lastly, a Gaussian kernel of 8 381 
mm FWHM was applied to spatially smooth the images in order to conform to the assumptions of 382 
the GLM implemented in SPM8. 383 
 384 
 385 
Statistical Analysis 386 
First-Level analyses 387 
First-level GLMs were created for both factorial and parametric analyses.  388 
 389 
1. Factorial Analysis. There were 10 event types. Each event-type was used to construct a 390 
regressor by convolving the stimulus timings with the canonical HRF. Each of the eight 391 
conditions was modelled as a separate regressor. In addition, one regressor modelled the 392 
activity during the effort periods (regardless of whether it was a first-person or third-person 393 
trial) and another regressor modelled the onsets of the other trial elements on every trial. 394 
Trials in which the subject failed to perform the correct number of cancellations during the 395 
effort period, failed to respond within 750ms of the onset of the trigger cue for the 396 
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judgement task, or failed to make the correct response on the judgement task were 397 
modelled separately as an extra regressor. This regressor included the onsets from all of the 398 
trial elements from these events. The residual effects of head motion were modelled as 399 
covariates of no interest in the analysis by including the six head motion parameters 400 
estimated during realignment.  401 
2. Parametric Analysis. Two GLMs were created at the first-level which employed a parametric 402 
approach. Each of these GLMs was constructed using the same events as those used in the 403 
factorial analysis (see above). For these GLMs, however, the instruction cue regressors were 404 
collapsed down into one regressor for the first-person instruction cues and one regressor for 405 
the third-person instruction cues. To create parametric regressors we divided the reward 406 
magnitude by the number of cancellations required and log-transformed these values, as in 407 
Croxson et al., (2009). The parameters outlined in fig.1 (the log-transformed net-values) 408 
were used as first-order parametric modulators of first-person and third-person instruction 409 
cue events. In addition, we included additional parametric modulators that were scaled with 410 
the effort level.  To examine activity which varied with net-value, the net-value parameters 411 
were orthogonalised with respect to the effort parameters. This ensured that activity which 412 
varied with either first-person net reward values, third-person net reward values or both 413 
could not be explained by the level of effort alone. The second GLM was similar except that 414 
the effort parameters were orthogonalised with respect to the net value parameters.  415 
 416 
 417 
 418 
 419 
Second-level analysis 420 
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Random effects analyses (Full-Factorial ANOVAs) were applied to determine voxels significantly 421 
different at the group level. SPM{t} contrast images from all subjects at the first-level were input into 422 
second-level full factorial design matrices. F-contrasts were conducted in each of the second-level 423 
Random-effects analyses. For the whole brain analyses, FDR correction was applied. To test the 424 
specific hypotheses in the ACC, 80% probability masks of the ACCg and ACCs were created and used 425 
as the search volumes for small volume correction (see anatomical localization). In addition, we also 426 
used the coordinates of Croxson et al. (2009) for small volume correction, as their study examined 427 
activity at the time of instruction cues that indicated to a subject the effort level required, and the 428 
level of reward available to them. Small volume corrections were applied as a sphere with 8mm 429 
radius around the peak coordinates from their analysis that looked for an interaction between 430 
reward and effort. This correction was applied by making a mask combining each of the spheres 431 
around their peak coordinates for the comparable contrast. 432 
 433 
 434 
Anatomical Localization 435 
For our main correction for multiple comparisons, we used 80% probability anatomical masks of the 436 
ACCg and ACCs. To create each mask, subject-specific masks of the ACCg and ACCs were constructed 437 
in FSL (http://www.fmrib.ox.ac.uk/fsl/). Although the cytoarchitectonic boundaries of the ACC have 438 
no corresponding gross anatomical landmarks, we defined the anatomical boundaries based on the 439 
location of these boundaries in previous literature investigating cingulate cytoarchitecture (Vogt et 440 
al., 1995). We used a posterior horizontal extent to each mask that lay 22 mm posterior to the 441 
Anterior Commisure, i.e. the posterior border of the midcingulate cortex (Vogt et al., 1995). We 442 
included all voxels that lay within the ACCs or the ACCg extending anterior to this border, including 443 
subgenual cingulate cortex. The final ACCs and ACCg masks included only voxels which were within 444 
each region in 80% of our subjects. We defined our anatomical mask of the ACCs as 445 
cytoarchtiectonic zones 24c, 24c', 32 and 32' as defined by Vogt and colleagues (2005). Vogt and 446 
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colleagues (2005) note that when there is only a single cingulate sulcus and no paracingulate sulcus, 447 
areas 24c and 24c' lie on the ventral bank of the sulcus and areas 32 and 32' lie in the dorsal bank of 448 
the sulcus. When a paracingulate sulcus is present areas 24c and 24c' lie in the both the ventral and 449 
dorsal banks of the primary cingulate sulcus and areas 32 and 32' lie on the additional paracingulate 450 
gyrus and extend over the ventral bank of the paracingulate sulcus. We created masks of the ACCs 451 
using exactly same anatomical criteria. When there was a single cingulate sulcus, the mask covered 452 
the dorsal and ventral banks of the sulcus. When there was an additional paracingulate sulcus, the 453 
mask included both the dorsal and ventral banks of the cingulate sulcus, and extended up to and 454 
including the ventral bank of the paracingulate sulcus. 455 
 456 
 457 
 458 
  459 
 20 
 
Results 460 
Behavioural results 461 
 462 
The subjects performed two tasks whilst inside the MRI scanner. On first-person trials they 463 
performed button presses in order to receive rewards themselves. On the third-person trials (see 464 
fig.1) they performed a second task, judging the level of reward (16p, 4p or 0p) that the confederate 465 
would receive on that trial, after they had monitored the confederate’s responses. For the effort 466 
task, subjects were required to make 2, 3, 8 or 12 button presses (cancelling out one of four visually 467 
cued targets by pressing one of four corresponding buttons on a keypad) in order to receive a 468 
financial reward (16p or 4p). These button presses were made during a 6600ms effort period. An 469 
important issue in this experiment was that the effort task constituted effort and not difficulty. In 470 
previous studies, the effort period (Botvinick et al., 2009; Croxson et al., 2009) was not constrained 471 
by a time-period, and as such cancelling out a large number of targets was not more difficult than a 472 
small number. In this study, the fixed response window may have caused subjects to find it more 473 
difficult to complete the 12 button presses than to make 8, 3 or 2 responses. This would confound 474 
any interpretation as effort-related activity would have been confounded with activity occurring due 475 
to the probability of success on the task. In turn, this could have led to subjects making a negative 476 
reward prediction or risk related prediction at the time of the cues on the third-person trials. 477 
However, if subjects performance was high and consistent across the effort and reward levels, then 478 
any potential confounds would be orthogonal to first-person or third-person net-value and therefore 479 
could not account for activity covarying with net-value at the time of the instruction cues. 480 
 481 
To determine whether effort was confounded with first-person effort task difficulty, the behavioural 482 
accuracy of subjects across each of the four effort levels were examined on the first-person trials 483 
(see fig.2a). Correct response trials were those where the subject made exactly the same number of 484 
cancellations as those specified by the cue. Notably, task accuracy was high (mean = 96.71%), 485 
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suggesting that subjects did not find the task difficult. Also, as can be seen in figure 2a, the accuracy 486 
was high for all four effort levels on the task. A repeated measures ANOVA was performed 487 
examining the effect of effort on task accuracy (% of correct responses). No main effect of effort on 488 
task accuracy was identified (F(2.18,28.37) = 2.098, p = 0.198). A planned pairwise comparison 489 
between the 2 and 12 button press trials showed no significant difference in accuracy (t(13) = 1.528, 490 
p= 0.151), indicating that they were not significantly less accurate at performing 12 button presses 491 
compared to two button presses. This suggests that the increased amount of effort in the task did 492 
not cause a significantly increased level of difficulty. 493 
 494 
The second task performed by subjects was a judgement of the reward level that would be received 495 
by the third-person. Subjects were required to monitor the responses of a third-person 496 
(confederate) and indicate whether they would receive a high reward (16p), low reward (4p), or no 497 
reward (0p) on each trial. Performance on this task was an important index of subjects’ 498 
understanding of the level of reward available and the effort necessary for its receipt on the third-499 
person’s trials. It was of particular importance that subjects performed ‘catch trials’, where the 500 
third-person made the incorrect number of button presses above chance level (33.3%). On these 501 
trials subjects could not perform the judgement task correctly without attending to the reward level 502 
and required effort level at the time of the instruction cue and also the number of button presses 503 
actually made by the third-person (see fig.2b). A paired samples t-test revealed that subjects’ overall 504 
task accuracy (mean = 93.93%) was significantly better than chance (t(14) = 54.5, p < 0.0001). On the 505 
catch trials the accuracy was (mean = 78.64%) also significantly greater than chance (t(14) = 12.76; p 506 
< 0.001). These results indicate that subjects were attending to the reward value and the level of 507 
effort at the time of the instruction cues and also the number of button presses actually made by the 508 
third-person. However, it was also important to demonstrate that the all subjects’ performance was 509 
similar for each level of effort and reward on the third-person trials, to ensure that the instruction 510 
cues for the effort and reward levels were not acting as first-person risk or negative reward 511 
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predictors on the third-person trials. To test this possibility we performed a 2x2 repeated measures 512 
ANOVA with the first factor being the reward level and the second being the amount of effort. There 513 
was no main effect of effort (F(2.41, 31.31) = 2.579, p = 0.083), reward (F(1,13) = 0.024, p = 0.880) 514 
and no interaction (F(2.18, 28.32 = 1.543, p = 0.231) on task accuracy. This would suggest that the 515 
level of reward, and crucially the number of cancellations being made by the confederate, did not 516 
affect the subjects ability to monitor the responses or indicate what level of reward was going to be 517 
received.  518 
 519 
We also performed a repeated measures ANOVA to examine whether there was a significant effect 520 
of net-value on accuracy, by breaking down the accuracy into 6 net-value conditions. We found no 521 
significant effect of net-value on task accuracy (F(2.431, 31.599) = 2.571, p > 0.05). Thus, our 522 
behavioural data suggests that there is no effect of net-value, reward or effort on the ability to 523 
perform the judgement task. As such, there is no difference in the risk of losing money between 524 
each of the different conditions on the third-person trials. Thus, the effect of predicting a loss of 525 
money on the third-person trials would not vary across conditions and therefore would not vary with 526 
social net-value. Consequently, risk cannot account for the activity we identified in the ACCg. The 527 
high-level of performance of subjects across all third-person conditions also, importantly, ensures 528 
that any activity we identified cannot be related to the subject predicting a reward in the first-529 
person conditions and predicting a punishment in the third-person condition. The performance of 530 
subjects on both tasks indicates that they were processing the reward value and the effort level at 531 
the time of the instructions cues on both first-person and third-person trials. 532 
 533 
 534 
 535 
 536 
 537 
 538 
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Imaging results 539 
This study tested two hypotheses about the processing of cost-benefit analyses in the ACC. First, 540 
that activity in the ACCg covaries with the net-value of rewards to be received by a third-person, 541 
signalling a cost-benefit analysis for others’ rewards. Second, that activity in the ACCs  covaries with 542 
the net-value of rewards on first-person trials, signalling one’s own cost-benefit analysis. We 543 
examined activity time-locked to the instruction cues and performed a parametric analysis to 544 
examine activity that covaried with the net-value of rewards, on both the first-person and third-545 
person trials. We also performed a 2x2x2 factorial analysis to confirm the results of the parametric 546 
analysis. The first factor was the Agency (first or third person), the second was Reward level (high or 547 
low) and the third was Effort, which was split into Low (2 and 3 button presses) and High (8 and12 548 
button presses) conditions. 549 
 550 
 ACCg and the net-value of rewards on 3
rd-person trials 551 
To test our first hypothesis, we examined whether activity in the ACCg was scaled with the net-value 552 
of rewards on the third-person trials. To constrain our search to a hypothesised area, a mask of the 553 
ACCg was used as a small volume correction for multiple comparisons. This mask ensured that any 554 
activated voxel at the group-level would be within the ACCg in 80% of the subjects. To ensure that 555 
the voxels identified in this analysis showed a significant effect on the third-person’s trials, but not a 556 
significant effect of net-value on the first-person’s trials, we excluded any voxels in which activity 557 
covaried with the net-value of rewards at the time of the first-person instruction cues. The voxels 558 
were excluded at a more liberal threshold (p < 0.05unc) to be conservative about the specificity of 559 
any response in the ACCg to third-person net-value. Activity in a cluster in the ACCg was found to 560 
vary with the net-value parameter (4, 22, 20, Z = 2.8, p < 0.05svc; see fig.3 a,b,c) in the midcingulate 561 
cortex (MCC), putatively area 24b’. It is important to note that the parametric effects identified in 562 
this analysis are from regressors that are orthogonal to the other parameter in the analysis (i.e. the 563 
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beta coefficient for net-value is for a regressor that is orthogonalised with respect to effort, and vice 564 
versa for the effort beta coefficient). Thus, the absence of a parametric effect of effort (Fig. 3B), 565 
reflects only the fact that the unique variance of the effort parameter cannot account for activity in 566 
the ACCg and not that effort doesn’t influence activity in this area. By showing that the net-value 567 
parameter significantly explains a unique portion of the variance, which is parameterised as effort 568 
divided by reward, we have shown an effect of both effort and reward on ACCg activity. 569 
An overlapping cluster, with the same peak voxel, also showed a significant interaction between 570 
Agency, Effort and Reward in the factorial analysis (Z = 3.09, p < 0.05svc). An additional, overlapping 571 
cluster that a contained the peak voxel from the parametric analysis also showed a main effect of 572 
Agency (Z = 5.57, p < 0.05svc) highlighting this area as differentially sensitive to first-person and 573 
third-person information. A cluster that overlapped with the peak voxel from the parametric analysis 574 
showed a significant effect of high vs low reward on the third-person trials (Z = 3.66, p < 0.05svc). No 575 
activity in any part of the ACCg was found to covary with net-value parameter on the first-person 576 
trials, and no voxels showed a main effect of Effort, or Reward (p > 0.05 uncorrected). A whole-brain 577 
analysis did not identify any voxels outside the ACCg that covaried with the net-value of rewards on 578 
the third-person trials, when using a whole-brain correction for multiple comparisons or when 579 
correcting around the coordinates of a previous study that investigated first-person net-value 580 
processing (Croxson et al. 2009). In addition, we found a simple effect between the high reward, low 581 
effort (2 or 3 cancellations) and the low reward, high effort conditions (8 or 12 cancellations) in a 582 
cluster in the ACCg that overlapped with that showing a parametric effect  (Z = 3.22, p < 0.05svc). 583 
That is we found a significant difference between the trials with the two highest net-value levels and 584 
the two lowest net-value levels. We found no differences between the high reward, high effort and 585 
the low reward low effort conditions in the ACCg even at a lowered threshold (p > 0.01unc). As such, 586 
we found no difference between the conditions with the same net-value in the ACCg on the third-587 
person trials. Thus, we identified activity in a portion of the ACCg was scaled with the net-value of 588 
rewards that were to be received specifically by a third-person.  589 
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In addition to the hypothesised activity in the ACC g, a second cluster putatively in a posterior portion 590 
of area 24b’, showed a significant two-way interaction between Agency and Reward in the factorial 591 
analysis (4, 16, 26; p < 0.05svc). This cluster did not overlap with that reported above. This effect was 592 
driven by a differential response between the HR and LR conditions on the third-person trials (p < 593 
0.05svc). Therefore, a portion of the ACC g that is distinct from that reported above is sensitive to the 594 
magnitude of a reward that is to be received by another, regardless of how much effort that will 595 
have to be exerted by them for its receipt.  596 
ACCs and first-person effort processing 597 
To test our second hypothesis, we examined whether activity in the ACCs was scaled with the net-598 
value of rewards on the first-person trials. To constrain the search to our hypothesised area, a mask 599 
of the ACCs was used as a small volume correction for multiple comparisons. This mask (see 600 
Methods) ensured that any activated voxel at the group-level would be within the ACCs in 80% of the 601 
subjects. To ensure that any identified voxel in this analysis showed a significant effect exclusively on 602 
the first-person’s trials, we excluded any voxels that covaried with the net-value of rewards at the 603 
time of the third-person instruction cues. The voxels were excluded at a more liberal threshold (p < 604 
0.05unc) to be conservative about the specificity of any response in the ACCg to first-person net-605 
value. There were no voxels in the ACCs in which activity covaried with net-value on the first-person 606 
trials. There were also no voxels in the ACCs in which activity covaried with net-value at the time of 607 
the third-person instruction cues. 608 
We did not find activity in the ACCs to be scaled with the net-value of rewards on first-person trials. 609 
However, previous studies have shown this area to be engaged during cost-benefit processing. Thus, 610 
we performed further exploratory analyses to examine whether activity in the ACCs signalled any 611 
other information on the first-person trials. We found activity in a posterior portion of the ACCs, in 612 
the Midcingulate cortex (MCC)/Rostral Cingulate Zone (RCZ) (0, -22, 50; Z = 3.44,  p<0.05svc, 613 
putatively area 23c/24c’) that showed a main effect of Effort (fig.3d). This region therefore 614 
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responded differentially to the level of effort, regardless of the level of Reward or Agency. Notably, 615 
the profile of the ACCs response was consistent with some (Croxson et al., 2009), but not all previous 616 
studies examining activity at the time of cues that signal the level of reward and the amount of 617 
effort required. Our study found a negative relationship between effort and the BOLD response in 618 
the ACCs, whereas other studies have shown a positive relationship (Prevost et al., 2010b; Burke et 619 
al., 2013). This discrepancy may be explained by the fact in this study and in Croxson et al., (2009), 620 
subjects were not engaged in deciding between differently valued options as they were in the other 621 
studies. It is well known that activity in the ACCs is modulated during decision-making by both 622 
chosen and unchosen options (Kolling et al., 2012). It is therefore possible that these differences can 623 
be accounted for by subjects being able to make choices to minimise costs and maximise rewards 624 
during decision-making tasks, but only process the discounted value of the reward when effort and 625 
reward are instrumentally instructed, as in our study and that of Croxson et al., (2009). Thus, our 626 
results still support previous accounts of this region’s involvement in the processing of cost-benefit 627 
information, although we did not find this region showing a sensitivity to reward magnitude  628 
 629 
First-person net-value 630 
 631 
While we did not find the hypothesised activity in the ACCs, activity in the nucleus accumbens (NA) (- 632 
8, 14, -4, Z = 2.8; p < 0.05 svc around the peak coordinate from Croxson et al. 2009) was found to 633 
covary with net-value parameter, at the time of the first-person instruction cues (fig.3). We 634 
therefore support previous findings that highlight the NA in cost-benefit related information 635 
processing (Botvinick et al., 2009; Croxson et al., 2009; Ghods-Sharifi and Floresco, 2010; Day et al., 636 
2011) 637 
 638 
 639 
 640 
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Discussion 641 
 642 
We tested two hypotheses about the role of the ACC in processing the net-value of rewards at the 643 
time which cues signalled the costs associated with rewards that would be received oneself or by a 644 
third-person. In line with our first hypothesis, activity in the ACCg covaried with the net-value of 645 
rewards to be received by the third-person, when the third-person incurred the cost of the effort. 646 
Our second hypothesis that activity in the ACCs would vary with the net-value of rewards at the time 647 
of instruction cues on the subject’s own trials was not supported. Rather, this region showed an 648 
effect of the anticipated level of effort on both the first-person and third-person trials. That is the 649 
ACCs signalled the effort level regardless of whether the effort was exerted oneself or by a third-650 
person. In addition, we found that activity in the NA scaled with the net-value of rewards on first-651 
person trials. Thus, while the ACCs processed information about the costs associated with a reward, 652 
regardless of who work to receive it, the ACCg was engaged when weighing up the benefits and costs 653 
associated with rewards that others were to receive.  654 
 655 
Previous studies have suggested that the ACCs processes information about one’s own decisions in a 656 
manner that conforms to the principles of Reinforcement Learning theory (RLT) (Behrens et al., 657 
2009). In RLT, choices are made based on the predicted net-value of decision-making outcomes. 658 
When an outcome is unexpected, prediction error signals code for the surprise evoked by the 659 
outcome, which serves to update future predictions (Rescorla and Wagner, 1972; Sutton and Barto, 660 
1998). Neurophysiological and neuroimaging studies have identified activity in the ACCs that reflects 661 
the predicted net-value of rewarding stimuli for oneself (Sallet et al., 2007; Quilodran et al., 2008; 662 
Jocham et al., 2009; Kennerley et al., 2009) and also neurons which signal that the value of an 663 
outcome is unexpectedly different from the predicted value  (Amiez et al., 2005; Matsumoto et al., 664 
2007; Sallet et al., 2007; Kennerley et al., 2011; Ribas-Fernandes et al., 2011). This evidence suggests 665 
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that an important functional property of the ACCs is to signal predictions about the outcome of one’s 666 
own decisions and signal when they are discrepant from one’s expectations. 667 
 668 
Neuroimaging studies suggest that the ACCg may mirror this property by showing that this area is 669 
activated when monitoring the unexpected outcomes of others’ decisions (Apps et al., 2012; Apps et 670 
al., 2013b). One recent neurophysiology study found that the ACCg and not the ACCs contains 671 
neurons that respond when a monkey is anticipating the delivery of a reward to another monkey 672 
(Chang et al., 2013). This suggests that the ACCg processes information about upcoming rewards that 673 
others will receive and that it is activated when the outcome of another’s choice is unexpected. 674 
However, in these studies there were no costs associated with the reward being delivered to 675 
another. Our study provides the first evidence that the human ACCg processes the predicted value of 676 
a reward that another will receive, supporting the claim that the ACCg processes information about 677 
others’ rewards. 678 
 679 
Anatomical evidence also supports the notion that the ACCg is engaged by both social and cost-680 
benefit related information. In monkeys, the homologous portion of the ACCg that was activated in 681 
this study (in the MCC) has strong connections to the posterior portions of the Superior Temporal 682 
Sulcus (pSTS), the Temporal Poles (TPs) (Markowitsch et al., 1985; Seltzer and Pandya, 1989; Barbas 683 
et al., 1999), and the paracingulate cortex (Pandya et al., 1981; Vogt and Pandya, 1987; Petrides and 684 
Pandya, 2007). These three regions are believed to form a core-circuit that is engaged when 685 
processing information about the mental states of others (Ramnani and Miall, 2004; Frith and Frith, 686 
2006; Hampton et al., 2008). There is no evidence of connections between these regions and the 687 
ACCs, supporting the notion that the information processed in the ACCg is more strongly linked to 688 
social behaviour than that which is processed in the ACCs. However, there is evidence to suggest that 689 
the ACCg is connected to the ACCs and the ventral striatum/NA. These two regions form a loop that is 690 
closed by return connections via the ventral pallidum and the thalamus (Groenewegen et al., 1993; 691 
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Kunishio and Haber, 1994; Spooren et al., 1996; Middleton and Strick, 2000; Nakano et al., 2000; 692 
Haber and Knutson, 2010). It has been argued that this circuit is important for cost-benefit 693 
information processing. Disruptions of the striato-pallidal connection (Mingote et al., 2008) and also 694 
to the striato-cingulate connection (Hauber and Sommer, 2009) perturb normal behavioural patterns 695 
on tasks that require  choices between options that have different associated costs. The connections 696 
of the ACCg with these regions suggest that the ACCg has access to information about the net-value 697 
of rewarding outcomes, whereas as the ACCs does not. Thus, anatomical evidence is consistent with 698 
the view that the ACCg processes net-value when it relates to a reward another will receive. 699 
 700 
Several lines of evidence support the notion that the ACCs and the NA are engaged during first-701 
person cost-benefit decision-making. Lesions of the ACCs disrupt decision-making on cost-benefit 702 
tasks (Walton et al., 2006; Hauber and Sommer, 2009). Single-unit recordings from neurons in this 703 
region in monkeys (Kennerley et al., 2009) and from homologous areas in rats (Hillman and Bilkey, 704 
2010), have identified neurons in which spike frequency is a function of both the magnitude of a 705 
reward and the number of lever presses required for receipt. Furthermore, neurons in this region in 706 
rats signal the value of rewards discounted by the costs associated with social interaction (Hillman 707 
and Bilkey, 2012). Depletions of dopamine in the NA modulate cost-benefit based decision-making 708 
and neurophysiological recordings have identified neurons in the nucleus accumbens that show 709 
differential spike frequency related to high and low effort conditions (Salamone et al., 2007; Font et 710 
al., 2008; Hauber and Sommer, 2009; Walton et al., 2009; Gan et al., 2010; Wanat et al., 2010). 711 
Similarly, previous fMRI studies have shown that activity in the ACCs and the NA is a function of the 712 
number of actions (Croxson et al., 2009; Kurniawan et al., 2010; Prevost et al., 2010) or the amount 713 
of cognitive effort (Botvinick et al., 2009; Schmidt et al., 2012) that has to be exerted, suggesting 714 
that both regions may play an important role in signalling the effortful costs associated with 715 
choosing a rewarding option. The results of our study are broadly consistent with these findings, 716 
highlighting that activity in the NA signals the net value of first-person rewards and activity in the 717 
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ACCs signals the effort-related costs associated with rewards that either oneself or another can 718 
obtain.  719 
 720 
Our study is the first to examine activity at the time of cues that signalled the net-value of rewards 721 
to be received by another. As a result we were able to extend upon the findings of previous 722 
neuroimaging studies investigating the functional properties of the ACCs in effort-discounting and 723 
social decision-making (Behrens et al., 2008; Prevost et al., 2010; Schmidt et al., 2012; Kurniawan et 724 
al., 2013; Meyniel et al., 2013). We show that this region processes the costs associated with both 725 
one’s own and others’ rewards, and not just the costs that will be incurred oneself. This finding is 726 
consistent with recent single-unit recording studies that identified ACCs neurons that respond to 727 
both one’s own or another’s decision-making outcomes (Yoshida et al., 2012). However, it is notable 728 
that our results are not consistent with those of Croxson et al., (2009) who found a sensitivity to 729 
both effort and reward magnitude in the ACCs. The absence of such an effect in our study could be 730 
due to the fact that that the effort period was a fixed time window in this study whereas in Croxson 731 
et al., (2009) the duration of the effort period was dependent on the rate at which cancellations 732 
were made. It could therefore be argued that ACCs activity may not be sensitive to the effort-733 
discounted value of a reward, but to temporally discounted reward values. However, such an 734 
interpretation is inconsistent with a previous study which showed that activity in the ACCs is not 735 
sensitive to the temporally discounted reward values, but was sensitive to the effort-discounted 736 
value of rewards (Prevost et al., 2010). Thus, the absence of an effect of net-value in the ACCs in this 737 
study is likely to be due to differences in the reward magnitudes between this and previous studies 738 
and not due to an insensitivity of ACCs activity to rewards in general. 739 
 740 
In summary, this study investigated the role of the ACC in processing cost-benefit analyses on 741 
rewards to be received oneself and by others. Our results highlight the ACC as an important 742 
structure in processing the net-value of rewards that will be received by others and also in 743 
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processing the costs associated with rewards regardless of who will receive them. However, these 744 
two functions are supported by the ACCg and the ACCs respectively. This study further illuminates 745 
the important role that the ACC plays in processing information about others decisions. 746 
 747 
 748 
 749 
Figure Legends 750 
Fig.1 (A) Trial structure. Participants performed trials which began with a colour-coded instruction 751 
cue. Blue indicated that the subjects (first-person) would perform button presses to receive a 752 
financial reward and brown indicated that the button presses would be performed by a confederate 753 
(third-person). The position of crosshairs on these stimuli indicated the level of reward available 754 
(16p or 4p) and the number of button presses required for reward receipt (two, three, eight or 12). 755 
Following this was the effort period, where the required button presses were made by cancelling out 756 
highlighted squares that each corresponded to one button on a keypad. Following this was a cue 757 
that indicated the number of button presses (‘cancellation cue’) and then a trigger cue. At the time 758 
of the trigger cue, on the third-person trials, the subjects were required to indicate how much 759 
reward the third-person would receive (16p, 4p or 0p if they made the incorrect number of button 760 
presses). Following this, there was feedback for performance on this judgement task and finally 761 
there was feedback for the individual who performed the effort task. The instruction cue onsets 762 
were jittered over the first two scans (TRs) of each trial, to sample evoked haemodynamic responses 763 
time-locked to these events evenly and independently from the other elements in the trials. The 764 
dotted lines indicate the cue that was jittered over the first two TRs. (B) Experimental design 765 
displayed in a table showing the 16 different conditions in the experiment. Net-value was calculated 766 
as the level of reward divided by the level of effort. These were then log-transformed to create the 767 
parameters used for the parametric analysis. 768 
 769 
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Fig.2. Behavioural Results. (A) Behavioural results for the performance of the effort task by the 770 
subjects themselves. Behavioural performance was high for each effort level and showed no 771 
significant differences between effort conditions. (B) Performance at judging the level of reward that 772 
was being received by the confederate for each of the 6 net-value levels. A Repeated Measures 773 
ANOVA showed no difference in performance by net-value. There was also no effect of effort or 774 
reward on the task accuracy.  775 
Fig.3. fMRI Results. Activity shown in the ACCg (A) that covaried with the net-value of the rewards. 776 
Beta coefficients (parameter estimates) (B) from the parametric analysis and perstimulus time 777 
histogram plots (C) of activity from the peak ACCg voxel. It is important to note that the beta 778 
coefficients from the parametric analysis reflect only the unique variance of a regressor. Thus, the 779 
absence of a significant beta coefficient for the effort parameter in the ACCg suggests that activity in 780 
this region cannot be explained by the unique variance of the effort parameter. However, as can be 781 
seen in the PSTH plot, ACCg activity is modulated by both the effort level and the reward level. This 782 
supports the notion that activity in this portion of the ACCg covaries with the net-value of another’s 783 
reward. (D)Activity shown in the ACCs that covaried with the effort level on both the first-person and 784 
third-person trials. (E) Parameter estimates from the peak ACCs voxel. (F) Activity shown in the NA 785 
that covaried with the net-vale on the first-person trials only. Parameter estimates from the peak NA 786 
voxel (G). All error bars reflect standard error of the mean. 787 
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